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THE CONTINUING VITALITY OF THE
GOULED RULE: THE SEARCH FOR
AND SEIZURE OF EVIDENCE
JAMES M. SHELLOW*

The Gouled rule emerged from the opinion of the United States
Supreme Court in the case of Gouled v. United States.' The rule states
that objects of only evidentiary value may not be seized by federal officers in the execution of a search, and that when such objects are seized,
they must be suppressed. The rule has been applied to the suppression
of evidence seized pursuant to the mandate of a search warrant, as well
as to the suppression of evidence seized incidental to an arrest.
The Gouled rule has been founded on the fourth and fifth amendments to the United States Constitution and therefore, until recently,
could be assumed to circumscribe only federal searches. It is now established that federal standards must be applied by state courts in determining the reasonableness of searches and seizures2 and in determining the sufficiency of the affidavit upon which a search warrant is
issued.3 Similarly, the fifth amendment's prohibition of compelled
self-incrimination has been recently held to control state criminal pro4
cedures.
Thus, the question of whether the Gouled rule arises under the
sanctions of the fourth amendment or the fifth amendment no longer
determines its applicability to state criminal trials; and to the extent
that the rule defines the permissible ambit of a federal seizure, it will
be binding upon the states as well. The Gouled rule presupposes the
lawfulness of the search; such lawfulness will be determined by federal standards. The rule sets forth the federal standards as to what
categories of objects may be seized thereby.
The origin of the Gouled rule was probably in the case of Entick v.
Carrington,5 where a search warrant was issued for the seizure of seditious papers and the court, in the opinion of Lord Camden, held that
the private papers of the accused were his personal property and, as
such, were immune from seizure.
The opinion and reasoning of Lord Camden was followed in the
*A.B., University of Chicago (1950); LL.B., Marquette University (1961);
C.P.A. (Wisconsin); partner, Shellow & Shellow, Attorneys at Law, Milwaukee, Wisconsin; chairman, Criminal Law Section, Milwaukee Bar Association; member, National Association of Defense Lawyers in Criminal Cases,
American Judicature Society.
1255 U.S. 298 (1921).
2 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) ; Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
3
Aguilar v. Texas, 84 Sup. Ct. 1509 (1964).
4Malloy v. Hogan, 84 Sup. Ct. 1489 (1964); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n,
84 Sup. Ct. 1594 (1964).
5 19 Howell St. Tr. 1029 (1765).
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American case of Boyd v. United States,6 in which the Court held that
the fourth and fifth amendments prohibited the seizure or the compelled production of private papers in which the accused had a property interest:
It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his
drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the
invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal
liberty and private property. .

. Breaking into a house and

opening boxes and drawers are circumstances of aggravation;
but any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony or of his private papers to be used as evidence to convict
him of crime or to forfeit his goods, is within the condemnation
of that judgment. In this regard7 the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into each other.
Thus, Entick and Boyd develop the proposition that it is the property
right of the accused which inheres in the private papers sought which
renders them immune from seizure; and the Gouled rule extends this
immunity to other chattels in which the accused has a property interest.
The case of Tones v. United States8 extended the concept of those who
have standing to object to unlawfully seized evidence, particularly in
the case of contraband the possession of which is itself a crime, and
modified the requisite that some provable interest in the property is
necessary in order to request that the evidence be suppressed.
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure9 recognize this distinction between objects in which no property interests inhere and hence
are subject to search and seizure, and those chattels in which a vested
property right of the accused exists and which may neither be searched
for nor seized. These rules provide that a search warrant may be
issued for the fruits of a crime, for the instrumentalities of its commission, for weapons, and for contraband; and they provide for these
objects alone. In a sense, each of the permissible objectives of a search
is a category of chattels in which either the possessor has no property
right or this right has been forfeited. The thief has no property right
in stolen goods ;1o the possessor has no property right in contraband ;1
and perhaps the instrumentalities of the crime and the weapons used
in its commission are deodands, which, as in the case of contraband,
are subject to immediate forfeiture.
It is likely that the admitted power to seize the fruits, or the
tools, of crime, itself rests upon a very ancient basis. .

.

. The

pursuit of a thief on hue and cry was a civil as well as a criminal
remedy, and the captors retook the booty and in early times
6116 U.S. 616 (1885).

7Id. at 630.
a 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
9 FED. R. CR. P. 41 (b).
10 Entick v. Carrington, supra note 5, at 1066.
11 Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946).
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themselves did execution; the tool or other object which killed a
man was deodand and forfeit; a burglar's kit or a counterfeiter's
plate have never been property in the ordinary sense, any more
than liquor since the enactment of section 25. Ruder times had
ruder remedies, but the power to seize such chattels probably
descends from notions which have long since lost their rational
foundation, and, while the method has changed, the substance
remains.
While the point has never been decided, the language of the
Supreme Court accords with our belief that it 12is only such
things that may be seized as an incident to an arrest.

Similarly, required records and public documents, because they do not
possess the character of private chattels, have been held not to be sub3
ject to the exclusions of the Gouled rule.1
Although the origins of the rule which protected private property
from inspection, search, and seizure may have been the common law
appreciation of the sanctity of property interests, more recent Supreme
Court cases indicate that a federal right of privacy underlies these
protections. Speaking of the fourth amendment in a dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Brennan stated:
But the first clause embodies a more encompassing principle. It
is, in light of the Entick decision, that government ought not to
have the untrammeled right to extract evidence from people.
Thus viewed, the Fourth Amendment is complementary to the
Fifth. .

.

. The informing principle of both Amendments is

nothing less than a comprehensive right of personal liberty in
the face of governmental intrusion.
The authority of the Boyd decision has never been impeached.
Its basic principle, that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments interact to create a comprehensive right of privacy, of individual
freedom, has been repeatedly approved in the decisions of this
Court. . . . So also, the Court's insistence that the Fourth
Amendment is to be liberally construed, . . . that searches for

and seizures of mere evidence as opposed to the fruits or instrumentalities of crime are impermissible under any circumstances.... and that the Fourth Amendment is violated whether
the search or seizure is accomplished by force, by subterfuge,
... by an invalid subpoena,

...

or otherwise .

.

. is confirma-

tion that the purpose of the Amendment is to protect individual14
liberty in the broadest sense from governmental intrusion.
(Footnotes omitted.)
As the rationale of the Gouled rule is obscured in the interaction
of the mandates of the fourth and fifth amendments, the application
12 United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F. 2d 202, 203 (2d Cir. 1926).
13 "Of course there is an important difference in the constitutional protection
afforded their possessors between papers exclusively private and documents
having public aspects." Davis v. United States, supra note 11, at 602.
14 Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 454-57 (1963) ; accord, Davis v. United
States, supra note 11, at 587.
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of the rule in the federal courts assumes the coloration of the amendment upon which the particular court believes the rule to be founded.
At the outset, the rule would seem to contravene common sense.
It appears, particularly to those authors whose philosophical orientation
favors the prosecution, that it is absurd to deny to searching officers
the right to seize evidence of the very crime for which they have established probable cause. 15 Even to those authors whose perspective
ordinarily is that of defense counsel, the Gouled rule appears an unwarranted extension of constitutional sanctions and a serious threat to
effective law enforcement.' 6 The Gouled rule, unlike most of the constitutional sanctions, was formulated in and by the Supreme Court;
and the Court has neither retreated from its original formulation nor
limited the application of the rule. As peculiar as the rule may appear
to some authors, authorities are pretty much agreed that the Gouled
rule is the law.' 7 While the statement of the rule is clear, the problems
arise in its application. Perhaps the most vexing of these, and the one
with which most courts have been concerned, is the problem of what
chattels are mere evidence of crime and what chattels are instrumentalities of crime.
In Gouled v. United States,'s the defendant was charged with being

a party to a conspiracy to defraud the United States and was charged
in a second count with mail fraud. The defendant sought to suppress
certain contracts which had been seized under the authority of a
search warrant. The grounds relied on by the defendant were that these
contracts constituted mere evidence of the offense and hence were immune from seizure. The Court in suppressing these contracts relied on
its opinion in Boyd v. United States 9 and held:

Although search warrants have thus been used in many cases
ever since the adoption of the Constitution, and although their
use has been extended from time to time to meet new cases
within the old rules, nevertheless it is clear that, at common law
and as the result of the Boyd and Weeks Cases,.

.

. they may not

be used as a means of gaining access to a man's house or office
and papers solely for the purpose of making search to secure
evidence to be used against him in a criminal or penal proceeding, but that they may be resorted to only when a primary right
to such search and seizure may be found in the interest which
the public or the complainant may have in the property to be
seized, or in the right to the possession of it, or when a valid
15 Inbau, Public Safety v. Individual Civil Liberties: The Prosecutor's Stand,
53 J. CRIm. L., C. &P.S. 85, 87 (1962).
16 Kamisar, Public Safety v. Individual Liberties, 53 J. CGIr. L., C. & P.S. 171,
177 (1962).
27 E.g., MAGunzE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 183 (1959); 8 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE §2184a,
at 45 (McNaughton rev. 1961) ; Annot., 129 A.L.R. 1296, 1300-01 (1940).
18255 U.S. 298 (1921).
19 116 U.S. 616 (1885).
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exercise of the police power renders possession of the property
by the accused unlawful and provides that it may be taken.2"
This paragraph was the formulation of the Gouled rule: only certain categories of property may be seized in the execution of a search
warrant. Later cases have formulated the rule to impose the same
limitations on a search incidental to an arrest. Although the original
formulation of the rule has a disarming simplicity, the meaning of the
rule can only be understood by an analysis of the opinions of the
courts which have applied it and by an attempt to infer from these
opinions a common thread.
Six years after its opinion in the Gouled case, the United States
Supreme Court decided Marron v. United States.21 In that case the
defendant sought to suppress certain ledgers and bills which related
to the operation of an unlawful liquor business. The Court, in denying
the motion to suppress, held that the ledgers and bills were "part of
the outfit

. . .

actually used to commit the offense ' 22 and, as such, were

instrumentalities properly subject to seizure. A similar line of reasoning
was employed in Foley v. United States23 with the same result that
ledgers and records of an illicit liquor operation were not suppressed.
In almost precisely the same circumstances, the Second Circuit in
United States v. Poller 4 held these records to be purely evidentiary and
suppressed them. A similar result was reached by the Sixth Circuit in
Bushouse v. United States.25 Subsequent to the Marron case, the
Supreme Court again considered a search involving prohibition violations in United States v. Lefkowit.

26

In that case the search was in-

cident to an arrest, and the defendant was successful in suppressing
the results. The Court held that the objects seized were "unoffending,"
27
and ruled that the search was exploratory and the seizure unlawful.
Thus, the Gouled case established the proposition that mere evidence of the commission of crime could not be reached by a federal
search warrant, and the Lefkowitz case extended the prohibition to
searches incidental to arrests. In the decade between these two opinions, search and seizure questions primarily arose out of prosecutions
for violations of prohibition laws; and the federal cases, typified by
the Marron opinion, threshed out questions as to what books and records were mere evidence and which books and records were instrumentalities. The Gouled rule and its underlying justification were dis20 255 U.S. at 309.
21275
U.S. 192 (1927).
22 1d.at 199.
2S64 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1933).
2443

F. 2d 911 (2d Cir. 1930).

25 67 F. 2d 843 (6th Cir. 1933).
26285 U.S. 452 (1932).
27 Further examples of the application of the Gouled rule by the federal courts
are cited in Comment, Limitations on Seizure of "Evidentiary" Objects-A
Ride in Search of a Reason, 20 U. CHi. L. Ray. 319 (1952-1953).
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cused at length by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Kirschenblatt.2s The case involved an alleged prohibition violation, and the officers were armed with a search warrant and arrested the defendant.
The court stated:
The forged note, the fraudulent prospectus, the policy slip,
the written contract, if that be forbidden, the seditious broadside-perhaps all these may be contraband and subject to seizure
when found on the premises. But the whole of a man's correspondence, his books of account, the record of his business,
in general, the sum of his documentary property-these, in our
upon his arrest as they certainly are
judgment, are as inviolate
29
upon search warrant.

The court thus declared the seizure of the particular papers to be improper and directed their return. Five years after Kirschenblatt, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was confronted with a similar motion to suppress in United States v. Gowen.30 The court, relying
upon its approach in Kirschenblatt, directed that the papers there
sought to be introduced were properly seized; the case was reversed
on other grounds3l and the Gouled rule remained as stated in Kirschenblatt. The Second Circuit again considered the seizure of evidence in
the case of Landau v. United States Attorney32 and there concluded
that a memorandum taken from the defendant was an instrumentality
of the crime of smuggling:
The right to retain the paper here may be placed on its
classification as an instrumentality of crime....
The memorandum seized here constituted an exact tabulation of the smuggled merchandise. Some such list was a necessity in this type of smuggling to be sure that the actual carrier
turned over all the goods. If papers can ever be instrumentality
of crime, when not
constituting the essence of the crime itself,
33
they are such here.

In the years following the Kirschenblatt case, the Gouled rule was applied by the federal courts in a variety of criminal prosecutions. In
another smuggling case, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
suppressed papers taken from the briefcase of the defendant and stated:
It may be laid down as a general principle that a reasonable
seizure can only be made of instrumentalities of the crime itself
and not of private papers which are mere evidence or indicia of
the commission of a crime.
... [T]he letters and other papers taken from the persons of the
2816

F. 2d 202 (2d Cir. 1926).

29Id. at 204.
30 40

F. 2d 593 (2d Cir. 1930).
Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
3282 F. 2d 285 (2d Cir. 1936).
33 Id. at 287.
31
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defendants are likewise mere evidences of 34the intention upon
the part of the defendants to commit a crime.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit adopted the Gouled
rule in its opinion in United States v. Thompson.3 5 The defendants were

accused of mail fraud and sought to suppress papers which they claimed
were mere evidence of the crime. The court stated:
A valid search may result in the seizure of papers as well
as other kinds of property. The test is not for the nature of
the property seized (papers or liquor for instance), but whether3
such property was by the accused used in perpetrating a crime. 1
In perhaps its clearest statement of the Gouled rule, the Supreme
Court in Harris v. United States37 reiterated those categories of objects which may be lawfully seized:
This Court has frequently recognized the distinction between
merely evidentiary materials, on the one hand, which may not be
seized either under the authority of a search warrant or during
the course of a search incident to arrest, and on the other hand,
those objects which may validly be seized including the instrumentalities and means by which a crime is committed, the fruits
of crime such as stolen property, weapons by which the escape
of the person arrested might be effected, and property the possession of which is a crime. 38 (Footnote omitted.)
The Court held in this case that the possession of altered draft cards
constituted a continuing offense and that these cards were properly
admissible as contraband. The Supreme Court again addressed itself
to this subject in a footnote in United States v. Rabinowitz3 5 in which
the defendant was charged with selling and possessing forged postage
stamps:
There is no dispute that the objects searched for and seized
here, having been utilized in perpetrating a crime for which arrest was made, were properly subject to seizure. Such objects are
evidentiary materials which may
to be distinguished from merely
40
not be taken into custody.
Again in Abel v. United States, 41 the Supreme Court concluded that
the papers seized were the instrumentalities of the crime itself and
denied a motion to suppress:
Searches for evidence of crime present situations demanding
the greatest, not the least, restraint upon the Government's intrusion into privacy; although its protection is not limited to
34

Takahashi v. United States, 143 F. 2d 118, 123 (9th Cir. 1944).
113 F. 2d 643 (7th Cir. 1940).
36 Id. at 645.
37331 U.S. 145 (1947).
38 Id. at 154.
39 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
40 Id. at 64.
41362 U.S. 217 (1960).
35
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them, it was at these
searches which the Fourth Amendment was
42
primarily directed.

And in Preston v. United States, 43 the Supreme Court again stated:
Unquestionably, when a person is lawfully arrested, the police
have the right, without a search warrant, to make a contemporor for
aneous search of the person of the accused for weapons
44
the fruits of or implements used to commit the crime.
This, then, is the extent of the mandate. The Supreme Court has
specifically held that mere evidence of crime may not be seized. In each
case since United States v. Lefkowitz- 5 in which the problem has arisen,
the Court has held that the Gouled rule should not be applied, on the
grounds that the evidence sought to be suppressed constituted instrumentalities of the offense. Further, each of the cases heretofore considered involved the suppression of documents; and while the Supreme
' 46
Court has specifically held that "there is no special sanctity in papers,
the Court has never applied the GouIed rule in a case in which papers
were not involved.
The same thread runs through the majority of the opinions of the
lower federal courts. While the courts speak in broad terms of evidentiary materials being immune from seizure, the rule is applied only
to private documents. Typical of these opinions is that of the Fourth
Circuit in the case of United States v. Boyette 4 7 in which the defendants
sought to suppress the earnings records of prostitutes. The court denied the motion, held that these records were instrumentalities of the
crime, and stated:
Though the search be reasonable, every article discovered is
not subject to seizure. The Supreme Court has frequently adverted to the distinction between seizures of contraband, fruits
of crime and the instrumentalities for its accomplishment, weapons and similar articles on the one hand, and the seizure of purely
Perhaps the influence of the
evidentiary materials on the other.
48
Fifth Amendment is felt here.

Thus, while the lower federal courts pay lip service to the sweeping
mandates of Boyd, Gouled, Lefkowitz, and Harris,ingenious arguments
are developed to avoid their application.
Several recent federal cases indicate that the trend is changing.
In the case of Morrison v. United States,49 the defendant was charged
with committing a perverted act on a young boy, and the prosecution
42 Id. at 237.
4384 Sup. Ct. 881 (1964).
441d.at 883.
45 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
46 Gouled v. United States, supra note 1, at 309.
4 299 F. 2d 92 (4th Cir. 1962).
48Id. at 94-95.
49262 F. 2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
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sought to introduce a handkerchief which allegedly bore some tangible
evidence of the offense. The court suppressed this evidence and held:
The handkerchief was merely evidentiary material. It clearly
was not the instrument or means by which the crime was committed, the fruits of a crime, a weapon by which escape might be
effected, or property the possession of which is a crime ...
This distinction was established in United States v. Lefkowitz and in Gouled v. United States.50 (Footnotes omitted.)
The following year in Williams v. United States,5 1 the court suppressed
the observations of a searching officer on the theory that visual evidence, as well as material evidence, is excluded under the Gouled rule.
In a recent prosecution for moonshining, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin applied the Gouled rule
and suppressed certain keys which allegedly connected the defendant to a
convicted co-defendant.52 The court stated:
Evidence which is neither contraband, tools, or fruits of a
crime but which consist of private documents or other chattels
of the defendant wanted by the government solely for the evidential value -have been held to be not subject to seizure incidental to arrest.
Prior to the opinions in Malloy v. Hogan53 and Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n 5 4 state forums could avoid the application of the
Gouled rule on the theory that the rule was founded upon the fifth
amendment of the United States Constitution and hence was not controlling in state prosecutions. This alternative is now foreclosed, and
the distinction between mere evidence and instrumentalities will confront state judges as it has their federal colleagues since 1921. 5

50 Id. at 450-51.
51263 F. 2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
52 United States v. Linsy, Criminal No. 63-CR-135, E.D. Wis., 1964. See also
Alioto v. United States, 216 F. Supp. 48, 51 (E.D. Wis. 1963).
5384 Sup. Ct. 1489 (1964).
54 84 Sup. Ct. 1594 (1964).
55 E.g., "A search, either with or without a warrant, is also unreasonable when
made merely for evidentiary material. . . ." State v. Manske, Criminal No.
2-16025, Milwaukee County Ct., Sept. 25, 1964. "We reject the state's contention that any search of the person of one lawfully arrested is a valid search.
Such search to be reasonable must be limited to weapons, or the fruits, or
instrumentalities of the crime for which the defendant was arrested." Barnes
v. State, No. 35, Oct. 6, 1964.

